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I. Introduction
Prosecutors are afforded enormous discretion in a multitude of decisions.2 For example, they decide who
will be charged with crimes,3 what crimes will be charged,4 what evidence will be submitted to a grand jury,5
whether discovery materials will be released earlier than mandated by statute,6 whether an accused will receive the
benefits for cooperation with the government,7 and whether cases will be plea bargained, dismissed, or tried.8 The

law sets the external boundaries for many of these functions, but prosecutors may move relatively freely within
these boundaries in exercising their executive function.9Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of

Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA LAW REV. 1, 2 (1971). Seldom do constitutional constraints impede the
discretionary power of prosecutors.10

Internal guidelines of the Department of Justice (DOJ) operate to assist federal prosecutors in making the
decisions that fall within the discretionary realm.11 These internal guidelines, usually found in the United States
Attorneys' Manual, provide Government prosecutors with guidance in making decisions.12 They also offer an

element of consistency to the decision-making process, provide education for newcomers to the department, and can
serve as a restraint on prosecutorial discretion.13
Prosecutors however, do not always adhere to these guidelines.14 Since courts routinely find these

guidelines strictly internal and unenforceable at law, the accused has no judicial recourse when prosecutors fail to

abide by the guidelines. Thus, when it comes to Department of Justice guidelines, a failure to follow office
procedure is an error that cannot be used by the accused who might suffer as a result of this violation.15

This Article focuses on criminal cases involving violations of Department of Justice internal guidelines. It

uses as examples three guidelines that are routinely violated by attorneys in the Justice Department and examines the

judicial response to these transgressions. It contrasts this judicial response to how violations of guidelines committed
in other administrative agencies are treated by the courts.16 After discussing the guideline violations and court

responses to these transgressions, this Article focuses on why compliance with the guidelines is important and how

it can be improved.

This Article advocates for a heightened review by the judiciary, legislature, and executive when

Department of Justice guidelines are ignored. This oversight, however, needs to be sensitive to the benefits of

continuing the practice of having the Department of Justice construct meaningful internal guidelines. The Article

examines remedies that find a balance between continuing the practice of having guidelines and yet also having

meaningful policies that are adhered to by department employees.

II. Department of Justice Guidelines

Department of Justice guidelines are written internally within the department. They are subject to change

at the will of the Attorney General, and for the most part, they are enforceable only as the department chooses to

enforce them. Unlike the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which are mandatory in nature and subject to judicial

imposition and review, the justice department guidelines are internally created and enforced. They are not a part of

the Code of Federal Regulations and they carry no legislative authority.17

Most of the internal guidelines of the Department of Justice are found in the United States Attorneys'
Manual.18 The Manual describes itself as a "looseleaf text" that "contains general policies and some procedures

relevant to the work of the United States Attorneys' offices and to their relations with the legal divisions,
investigative agencies, and other components within the Department of Justice."19

The

U.S.

Attorneys'

Manual is not a stagnant document, as sections within the Manual are continually being revised. These revisions
include "policy" changes that require several layers of departmental review before being added to the Manual,20U.S.
ATTYS. MAN. 1-1.600. and "procedural" changes21 that are not subject to a similar scrutiny prior to insertion in the

Manual. The Manual is "prepared under the general supervision of the Attorney General and under the direction of

the Deputy Attorney General, by the United States Attorneys, the Litigating Divisions, the Executive Office for the
United States Attorneys, and the Justice Management Division."22

Publication of prosecutorial guidelines is relatively new. In a 1971 article, Professor Norman Abrams
advocated for a comprehensive prosecutorial policy.23Abrams, supra note 8, at 57. Although he offered eight
arguments that might discourage publishing internal policy,24 he stressed the need to move in this direction. He

predicted that "making prosecutorial policy public" would "subject it to scrutiny, evaluation, and criticism by
outsiders."25

His prediction has proved to be accurate. Today federal prosecution policy is easily accessible in both hard
text and online.26 Also apparent is a growing number of appellate decisions that raise issues premised upon a

violation of the Justice Department policies. Irrespective of whether there is a correlation between the publication of

the guidelines and its increased use by defense counsel, there are enormous benefits to the adoption and use of the

guidelines.

The federal guidelines used by Department of Justice attorneys today are comprehensive and detailed. The
guidelines provide guidance in a wide array of areas such as charging,27 when it is necessary to seek approval from
superiors,28 procedures regarding international prosecutions,29 and department policy on sentencing.30
Some of the Department of Justice guidelines have been criticized, such as those for law office searches31
and for grand jury subpoenas to defense counsel.32 Some of the rules authorize conduct that might be frowned upon

by the general public. For example, the Department of Justice guidelines defines "lures" as "a subterfuge to entice a

criminal defendant to leave a foreign country so that he or she can be arrested in the United States . . . or in a third

country for subsequent extradition, expulsion, or deportation to the United States." The guidelines permit

prosecutors to use "lures" and merely require that the prosecuting attorney "consult with the Office of International
Affairs before undertaking a lure to the United States or a third country."33

In many instances, the guidelines offer the accused benefits that exceed constitutional mandates. For

example, although prosecutors have no constitutional obligation to give grand jury witnesses advice warnings
informing them when they are a "potential defendant in danger of indictment,"34 the guidelines mandate attorneys to
provide an "advice of rights" form to witnesses who are likely to be indicted.35 In this, and other instances, the

accused receives clear benefits by the enactment of these guidelines.
In some cases the guidelines offer internal constraints to overly broad statutes.36

For example, the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act37 has been criticized as overly broad and having draconian

penalties, especially in the forfeiture area.38 The Department of Justice provides extensive policy to monitor and
control the filing of cases by its office.39 In contrast, no guidelines exist to control filings by private parties using

the civil provisions of RICO. Congress has intervened in the civil context to place a statutory restriction on how
private parties may use the statute.40 Few Congressional restraints, however, have been placed on prosecutors who

bring criminal RICO cases. Former Assistant Attorney General Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr. noted that "[t]he key to our

use of RICO in prosecuting white-collar crime is to confine the statute's use to those cases where the unlawful

conduct was both continuous and egregious and where there is the prospect of significant forfeiture of ill-gotten
proceeds or of interests in a tainted enterprise." 41

Guidelines have also been used to stop controversial practices that might be implemented by individual
Assistant United States Attorneys or the offices that they work within.42 For example, mail fraud is included as a
predicate act for a RICO charge.43 Tax fraud is not on the list of predicates for RICO. Since prosecutors could not

directly use tax fraud to obtain the increased RICO penalties, they creatively made the tax fraud charge into mail
fraud44 by claiming that the mailing of a false tax return to be mail fraud.45 By making tax fraud into mail fraud, the

crime became a predicate for RICO and when the conduct formed a pattern of racketeering it became subject to an
increased sentence. This practice was criticized.46 In 1989, the Department of Justice added a guideline that stated

that "only in exceptional circumstances" would authorization be granted for a RICO charge when a mail fraud
predicate was being premised upon the mailing of a false tax return.47 See U.S.ATTYS.MANUAL § 6-4.211(1)

(footnote omitted). This guideline, however, has not ended this creative prosecutorial charging of mail fraud for the
mailing of a false tax return.48
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